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Abstract
In this discussion note I will critically analyze the work of J. Wentzel van Huyssteen
and review the volume The Evolution of Rationality, published in his honor. This
volume shows the great value and wide influence of the contributions of Van
Huyssteen to the fields of ‘Science and Theology’ and ‘Science and Religion’ in
general, and his postfoundational concept of rationality in particular. However, I
will demonstrate that, in his work religion – unlike science – is not taken seriously.
Although Van Huyssteen reflects on the specific nature of religion, he does not
sufficiently incorporate the results of these reflections into his works. The same
fallacy can be found in others who have written on ‘Science and Religion’ and
‘Science and Theology’.
1 Introduction
In celebration of the 65th birthday of Jacobus Wentzel Vrede van Huyssteen,
James I. McCord Professor of Theology and Science at Princeton Theological
Seminary, a very interesting compilation of essays has been edited by F. LeRon
Shults. During his career Van Huyssteen has written on several methodological
aspects of the interdisciplinary conversation between science and theology, a
broad range of theological topics, and a diverse number of examples exploring
the relation between the natural sciences and religion, in particular with respect
to evolutionary biology and biblical faith. This short overview of Van Huyssteen’s
interests demonstrates his conviction that new and exciting discoveries take place
on the boundaries between the academic disciplines. In his view, interdisciplinary
research does not mean that data and theories can be transferred easily from one
discipline to another: theological convictions about the Imago Dei, for instance,
cannot function in the fields of the life sciences, and scientific theories about
human evolution do not necessarily set the agenda for theological arguments. His
starting point is that the integrity of every discipline should be protected. From
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that position, different disciplines can share concerns and can possibly converge
on problems they identify as common.1
Van Huyssteen’s attention for the interdisciplinary conversation reveals his
fascination with the results of the sciences and his enthusiasm for the way these
results can, first, elucidate religious conceptions and representations and, second,
help one to reflect on theological claims. His work leaves no doubt that Van
Huyssteen takes the sciences seriously. This is proved not only explicitly by his
respect for the results of, for instance, paleoanthropology and genetics but also im-
plicitly by the way he compares the rationality of science and theology. Although
he does not make scientific rationality absolute in the sense of a special kind of
rationality that stands far above other forms of reasoning, it is still the prototype
of human reason. But what about religion? Does he take religious practices and
belief systems seriously as well? A quick glance at, for instance, the preface of
his dissertation or the theses that accompany it makes clear what can be found
in many passages throughout his work:2 Van Huyssteen considers himself to be
working within the Christian tradition. In this way he does, of course, take reli-
gion seriously. However, in this discussion note I will raise questions about the
way his view on religion is influenced by the conversation with the sciences. Is it
possible that the consequence of his fascination with the results of the scientific
disciplines and his discovery that rationality in science and theology share many
features, is that the specific character of religious practice has disappeared from
view? I hope to answer this question in this article. In doing so, I will focus on an
aspect that is often taken for granted in studies in the field of Science and Religion
and Science and Theology. In such studies it is usually the case that the results
of science are taken very seriously and are considered to have a strong hold on
thinking in theology. Scholars in these fields are acquainted with the latest results
of, for instance, fundamental physics or molecular biology of the cell, and they try
to relate these results to theological statements. For the most part, however, these
statements are not coming from religious studies or academic theology; perhaps
they are constructed by the scholar herself or they may be the expression of the
religious convictions of someone the scholar knows. The concept of religion is
then not taken seriously. It simply goes without saying. My aim is to discuss the
unreflected use of this concept and thereby to contribute to the debates in these
fields.
In The Evolution of Rationality – the volume to which this discussion note
is related – contributions on Van Huyssteen’s interests are divided into three
sections: philosophical, scientific and theological explorations. These sections are
preceded by an overview of the key themes of Van Huyssteen’s work. Throughout
the volume the reader can find other paragraphs that summarize the Leitmotif
1. J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, Alone in the World? Human Uniqueness in Science and Theology
(Grand Rapids / London 2006), 9, 154, 219, 238, 270.
2. Idem, Teologie van die rede: Die funksie van die rasionele in die denke van Wolfhart Pannenberg,
(Kampen 1970); Idem, Teologie as kritiese geloofsverantwoording (Pretoria 1986), 47–61; Idem, Essays
in Postfoundationalist Theology (Grand Rapids / London 1997), 66–69; Idem, Alone in the World? 160,
322.
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of Van Huyssteen’s oeuvre: the development of a postfoundational concept of
rationality. From this perspective, the title of the book and the common theme of
the contributions – ‘the evolution of rationality’ – is a logical one. Reflection on
the ideas and topics in this volume helps to illuminate the central claim of this
discussion note: religion must be taken seriously. Because of some observations in
The Evolution of Rationality (and a few marginal notes to Van Huyssteen’s work), we
become acquainted with specific features of the phenomenon of religion, features
that make it hard to interpret the relation between science and religion in terms
of a ‘duet’.
It is a privilege to write this discussion note. In 2001 I was selected for the
Doctoral Research Scholar Program at Princeton Theological Seminary. During
the autumn of that year I studied under Van Huyssteen’s supervision and at-
tended one of his courses on rationality and religion. I remember with gratitude
his lively interest in the subject of my PhD, his friendly hospitality to me and my
family, his suggestions regarding the best jazz clubs of New York and his enthusi-
astic description of the section on evolution in the American Museum of Natural
History—resulting in an unforgettable visit. My appreciation for his work and
person does not imply, of course, that I am uncritical of his writings or the es-
says in his honor. As a philosopher, it is my obligation to express my appreciation
through a critical evaluation of this Festschrift. In the next section I will summarize
all the contributions of the volume. I will then make some evaluative remarks and
finally look carefully at the question if Van Huyssteen takes religion seriously.
2 The Evolution of Rationality
In the first contribution Kenneth A. Reynhout describes the chronological
development of Van Huyssteen’s understanding of rationality, punctuated by
some biographical data. During the first phase (1970–1989) Van Huyssteen was
searching for a set of minimal criteria for a credible model of theological ratio-
nality. He identified three criteria: theological statements must (i) depict reality,
(ii) have critical and problem-solving ability, and (iii) be productive and progres-
sive. This model can be considered a form of critical realism. After this period,
Van Huyssteen paid a great deal of attention to the interdisciplinary shaping of
rationality in a postmodern context (1990–1999). He developed a ‘postfoundation-
alist model of rationality’ in which context, interpreted experience, and tradition
are key concepts. Also important is his claim that there are three resources for
rationality in science and in theology, namely, (i) the quest for intelligibility, (ii)
responsible judgment skills, and (iii) progressive problem-solving. During the last
phase of his development (until now) Van Huyssteen has been concentrating on
the evolutionary origins of rationality and human uniqueness. The highlight of
this period is the publication of Alone in the World?—a book that emerged from
the prestigious Gifford Lectures.
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2.1 Philosophical Explorations
Calvin O. Schrag is one of those authors to whom Van Huyssteen owes a
great deal for the development of his thought on rationality. Referring to Van
Huyssteen’s phrase, ‘the turn from foundationalism to holism’, Schrag explores
how reason plays itself out in philosophical and theological endeavors. He defines
the foundationalism vs. holism problem as a fundamental difference of opinion
regarding the role of certainty. While foundationalism finds its mission in a quest
for certainty, holism is suspicious about any claims to certainty in matters of
both knowledge and value. According to Schrag, the concrete lifeworld of human
thought, discourse and action can be seen as a model for holistic practices in which
pre-theoretical perceptions, feelings, desires and emotions are present. In these
practices we find the fabric of our communicative activities: a holistic interplay of
acknowledgment, recognition, and repetition. By way of a subtle analysis of the
thought of Hegel, Heidegger, Sartre and Kierkegaard, Schrag shows that traces
of rationality can already be found on this pre-theoretical level. His contribution
can therefore be considered as another argument for Van Huyssteen’s claim that
the rejection of the epistemological paradigm of foundationalism does not mean
an abandonment of rationality per se.
How can scientific and theological statements be qualified as empirically
reliable and as open to correction? Van Huyssteen has taken up this question dur-
ing his career, severely criticizing the views of imperialist scientists and extreme
postmodernists and – by way of an answer – has developed his own theory of
rationality. Although Wesley Wildman appreciates Van Huyssteen’s efforts to find
a solution to this problem, he thinks the postfoundational theory of rationality is
characterized by a significant gap. Using the work of Peirce and Dewey, Wildman
criticizes Van Huyssteen’s highly theoretical approach. He makes clear that it is
far from self-evident that one should – as Van Huyssteen does – simultaneously
embrace fallibilism and reject abstract generality. He also claims that the idea
of correctability is strangely absent from Van Huyssteen’s work, and thus the
reader is left with no answer to the question ‘Why does reason work?’ At this
point the pragmatists could have provided Van Huyssteen with an answer. They
referred to the so-called ‘feedback mechanisms’ of varying strengths in different
academic disciplines such as theology and physics. According to Wildman, among
other things, feedback mechanisms serve to explain the different ways in which
disciplines produce consensus. Such mechanisms presuppose metaphysical hy-
potheses that connect reality to experience and truth to consensus. In Wildman’s
view, it is the lack of explicit metaphysical reflection in Van Huyssteen’s works
that causes the gap in his postfoundational concept of rationality.
In ‘Rationality and Different Conceptions of Science’ Mikael Stenmark ex-
plores the extent to which values, ideology, and religion should be a part of
contemporary science. Endorsing Van Huyssteen’s reflection on the postmodern
challenge to rationality, Stenmark scrutinizes the criticism of the value-free view of
science and the proposed alternatives. He defines the value-free view as ‘the stand-
point that science should be autonomous, neutral, impartial, non-responsible, and
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non-normative’. This means, first, that values and priorities should be set by the
scientists themselves (‘autonomy’). Second, it means that science should be a uni-
versal enterprise: regardless of, for instance, religious affiliation, everyone may
be part of and benefit from science (‘neutrality’). Third, it means that moral judg-
ments, ideological claims, or religious beliefs are not valid as grounds for the
acceptance of scientific theories (‘impartiality’). It means, fourth, that scientists
are not responsible for the applications of their theories (‘non-responsibility’) and,
fifth, that science is a matter of facts and not of norms (‘non-normativity’). Since
this view of science is undermined (by the twofold turn to scientific practice) the
question of an alternative conception of science is raised. The rest of his chapter is
devoted to a subtle analysis of the proposals of such a ‘non-autonomous, partisan,
non-impartial, responsible, and normative’ conception. Referring to authors such
as Helen Longino, Alvin Plantinga, Ronald Giere, and Edward Wilson, Stenmark
makes clear that ideological relevance does not imply ideological partisanship,
that partisanship does not entail non-impartiality, that biased theories can still be
true, and that a crucial difference exists between partisan science and normative
science. Because of the distinctions made in Stenmark’s contribution, the next
step can be undertaken: a discussion of what elements should be contained in a
plausible contemporary view of science.
Jerome A. Stone compares the work of Van Huyssteen with two other authors
who combine an integrationalist approach (Barbour) with a focus on evolution-
ary biology: Philip Hefner and Karl Peters. Stone focuses first on methods of
the science-theology encounter. Heffner considers engagement with the sciences
to be essential for doing theology. For him, this means that theological state-
ments must be formulated as fruitful and falsifiable tentative hypotheses. Peters
sees science and religion as two maps of the same area. Science uses empirically
based methods to achieve results that are open to public criticism, whereas re-
ligions supply wisdom for living. According to this view, no conflicts can arise
between these different approaches. Van Huyssteen speaks of overlapping areas
of discourse with shared epistemic strategies. For example, both disciplines are
embedded in traditions where the same concept of rationality can be discerned.
Methods are analogous but different. Regarding substantive issues – Stones’ sec-
ond focus – Hefner concentrates on what he calls the ‘created co-creator’ and
explores trans-kin altruism. Peters writes about God as the process of variation
and selection and reflects on human selfhood. Van Huyssteen examines paleoan-
thropology and, among other things, neurophilosophy in order to reconstruct the
theological concept of the Imago Dei. Stone concludes that all three scholars are
eminently successful regarding the fruitfulness of their work for further research
and discussion.
Philip Clayton shows that Van Huyssteen’s work acknowledges one of the-
ology’s most serious challenges today: the problem of the meaningfulness of
religious experiences. Paying close attention to the role of the social sciences,
Van Huyssteen insists that theology and the sciences offer alternative interpreta-
tions of our experience and that the ‘meaning constructions’ in theology can be
rationally assessed. Although Clayton agrees in the end with Van Huyssteen’s
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conclusions, he also claims that to come to these conclusions is more difficult than
Van Huyssteen acknowledges. Clayton shows this by treating the challenge of
functionalism – ‘the fact that people hold religious beliefs is better explained by
their function than by their truth’ – in depth. He suggests that we must embrace
the results of functionalism and then give a theological account of the social func-
tions of religion. It is in this way that we truly act in line with Van Huyssteen’s
starting point: taking science seriously. Clayton suggests that in the human sci-
ences the question of meaning can itself lead to theological issues: explanations
of the human being must ultimately reflect on questions of divine nature and
intention.
The main statements of ‘Realism, Religion, and the Public Sphere: Chal-
lenges to Rationality’ by Roger Trigg are, first, that rationality has to be grounded
in reality and, second, that religion appears to be a non-rational phenomenon
because many people seem to assume that religion is not about reality. The first
statement is endorsed by Trigg. The rational is defined in terms of what people
accept. When is a belief acceptable? One must at least know that it is not wrong.
Therefore, the idea of an independent reality must be introduced. Without such an
idea truth is nothing more than counting heads. The second statement is rejected
by Trigg. Since religion is not allowed into the public sphere in modern society,
it is considered a private affair—religious claims of universal significance are not
accepted. This shows that, unlike science, religion is not considered to appeal to
public standards of rationality. The reason for this is the hidden presupposition
that religion is not about any independent reality. But why should this assumption
be accepted? Trigg shows that this is far from obvious and that anybody who is
dissatisfied with the privatizing of religion must argue against it. Only if religion
is acknowledged as making claims about reality can it, according to Trigg, claim
a place on the public stage.
Keith Ward reflects on the relation between reason and the Enlightenment.
Many people seem to assume that Enlightenment thinkers in general would have
claimed that (i) reason discloses truth about reality, and (ii) faith is an irrational
leap in the dark. Ward shows that philosophers such as Hume, Kant and Hegel
dethroned reason – although not completely – and he provokes his readers by
stating that the Enlightenment did not raise reason too high but brought it too
low. For Hume and Kant, reason is not the ultimate arbiter of faith and, for
Hegel, reason must integrate religious belief with other forms of knowledge. Ward
concludes that the heritage of the Enlightenment must not be conceptualized as
the liberation of the human mind from religious tyranny but as the promotion of
the liberty of thought and critical enquiry.
2.2 Scientific Explorations
What were the initial causes of the awakening of spirituality? During which
stage of human evolution did religion emerge? And what is the nature of these
forms of spirituality and religion? These questions are treated in the contribution
by Jean Clottes. Regarding the first question, Clottes lists the uncertain answers:
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the development of the brain, the increasing degree of social organization, the
perfection of tools and the reflection on dreams must all have played a major role.
With respect to the question of the emergence of spirituality, the clues belong to
three different domains: burials, art, and complex actions. The first traces of evi-
dence – the presence of iron oxides – can possibly be found among the Acheulian
culture of Homo erectus. By describing some famous caves and sites Clottes shows
that we are more certain regarding the Neanderthals: they buried their dead and
occasionally deposited offerings with them. With the next step we reach our direct
ancestors, the Cro-Magnons: the Homo sapiens who entered Europe at about 40,000
years ago. This Palaeolithic people left its drawings on the walls of huge chambers
in dark caves such as those at Lascaux. Clottes concludes – without explaining
for example the nature of their sacred stories – that the art in the caves was done
within the framework of a shamanistic type of religion. Whether the nature of this
form of religion can be understood or not remains questionable due to the lack of
solid data.
In his article David Lewis-Williams intends to show that we can. In ‘Building
Bridges to the Deep Human Past: Consciousness, Religion, and Art’ he looks for
a new method to understand how early human beings thought and how they
conceived the world around them. In a case study he explores the way in which
ethnography renders explanation of San rock art images (Bushmen of southern
Africa) possible. The traditional approach exists in a constant ‘to-ing and fro-ing’
between San ethnography and the images. Once it became clear that San rock
art can be termed shamanistic – and thus has to do with altered states of con-
sciousness – neuropsychology began to play a promising role. Assuming that the
human brain and its associated nervous system are universals, the meaning of the
paintings found in the Upper Paleolithic caves (where no relevant ethnographical
record exists) could be explained. Some geometric images found in San rock art
can be seen as expressions of ‘wired’ experiences of altered consciousness and can
be interpreted as beliefs in a spiritual realm. On the basis of a sophisticated kind
of analogy, the same geometric images in the Upper Paleolithic caves could also
be understood as signs of a belief in passages to the spirit world.
In ‘The Origins of Human Cognition and the Evolution of Rationality’ Ian
Tattersall provides an overview of the emergence of the hominid family. Begin-
ning with the 7–6 million-year-old Sahelanthropus tchadensis and ending with the
Cro-Magnons, Tattersall shows that behavioral and physical innovation do not
proceed hand-in-hand. This means, for instance, that early bipedal hominids did
not move beyond the cognitive level of modern apes and that the first stone tool-
makers were not significantly different physically from their non-toolmaking pre-
decessors. This changed with the emergence of the Cro-Magnons. The production
of symbolic objects distinguished them in a decisive way from their predecessors.
Here behavior and physiology are connected: symbolic acts are the outcome of
symbolic processes in the mind. Tattersall’s conclusion is really about the evolu-
tion of rationality: our capacity for rational reasoning is the sum of, on the one
hand, old emotional and intuitive centers of the brain, and, on the other, newer
structures that permit symbolic thought.
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Christopher Southgate relates two issues that at first glance seem to be un-
connected: the Cro-Magnon’s bison paintings at Niaux and contemporary debates
about the Kyoto protocol. These different issues are bound together in his contribu-
tion by the work of the nineteenth-century Catholic poet Gerard Manley Hopkins.
Hopkins’ use of the terms ‘inscape’ (the scientific and particular features of an
entity) and ‘instress’ (the energy that binds individual entities into the Whole
and the impact of inscapes on the observer) are, according to Southgate, helpful
in the contemporary conversation between theology and ecology. As a visitor to
the Grottes de Niaux, Southgate received ‘the full charge of instress of bison’, a
feeling that, he suggests, must have been inspired by the hunter-gatherers who at-
tached a deeper reality to the bison. However, people can also fail to instress their
environment, with the result that they forget to preserve it. In Southgate’s view,
science and theology can help to reverse this situation: science by giving us the
right information and theology by providing us with the right ethical imperatives
so that we are ‘consciously instressing God’s creative activity’.
In ‘Generating Life on Earth: Five Looming Questions’ Holmes Rolston III
writes that in order to survive, organisms need to gain, use, and transmit vital
information. For human beings there is a supplementary condition: ‘to figure out
five big unknowns’. Vital information, such as proactive information recorded in
the genes, is needed in enormous amounts. Where does it come from? Science has
no clear answer for this mysterious genesis. In addition to the question about the
creation of information, Rolston reflects on the question if evolutionary history
is entirely contingent or quite probable. Among other things, the well-known
positions of Simon Conway Morris (‘the inevitable and pre-ordained trajectories of
evolution’) and Stephen Jay Gould (‘we are the accidental result of an unplanned
process’) are explained. The third question concerns the way the information
became possible: was it always there or did it emerge during history? Rolston
seems to favor the latter possibility: co-option generates novel possibilities. But
then another question comes to the fore, where is such a tendency located? If
biology were anthropic, we could possibly provide an answer to this question.
But since we do not know this, the final question concerns the explanation of the
appearance and emergence of humans. Pondering these five unanswered looming
questions, Rolston suggests a sixth: Does evolution leave room for faith in God?
According to him, nothing prevents us from ‘praising the Spirit in, with, and
under nature’.
Michael Ruse’s starting point in his contribution entitled ‘Darwinism: Foe or
Friend’ is the claim that a progressive understanding of Darwinism does not imply
atheism but supports Christian theology. Therefore, it is not necessary to ‘quail
or quake before the onslaughts of the non-believers’—something he fears Van
Huyssteen does now and then. In his view, Darwinism, as the true evolutionary
theory, must be the starting point for theology. It is remarkable that Ruse, in his
provocative style, uses the ideas of Richard Dawkins – the atheist – to underpin his
claim. From his perspective, Dawkins is a evolutionary progressionist who thinks
that the process of evolution can be reconstructed as a hierarchy of organisms with
humans (because of our consciousness) at the top of the scale. This is precisely
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what many Christians have maintained during the last 2000 years. Thus, Ruse
concludes that ‘the Christian should welcome the writings of Dawkins, not fear
them’.
In ‘Rationality and Interpreted Experience: The Efficacy of Phenomenal Con-
sciousness’ Michael L. Spezio claims that phenomenal consciousness (first-person
experience of agents) plays an important role in human rationality and that it is
even crucial for the rationality of fundamental personal decisions. The most im-
portant argument for the importance of phenomenal consciousness in rational
decision-making is that mental time travel is required for a rational choice and
that such a thing cannot exist without first-person experiences. Spezio argues
that a neuroscientific analysis of phenomenal consciousness can help to work
out a postfoundational account of rationality. Although Van Huyssteen already
included the concept of ‘interpreted experience’ in this account, Spezio suggests
that it can be developed further by realizing how first-person experiences such
as ‘imagined tragedies and envisioned triumphs’ determine the formation of our
commitments.
New developments in science can cause threats to accepted understandings
of the self. As Van Huyssteen notes, the traditional religious self-perception – from
moral perfection in paradise to sinful persons after the fall – was modified by the
development of evolutionary theory. In line with this, John Hedley Brooke asks the
question ‘What difference did Darwin make?’ concerning several aspects of hu-
man self-understanding. In addition to the dignified and the rational knowing self
(see below), Brooke considers the unique, the immortal, the moral, the aesthetic,
and the suffering self. Does man preserve his dignity if he is seen as ape-like?
From the perspective of traditional Christian understanding, Samuel Wilberforce,
the Bishop of Oxford in Darwin’s time, argued that he does not. Brooke shows
that the Darwinian challenge was not a unique one. A few decades earlier similar
debates had occurred but then between Lamarck and Lyell. Although such dis-
cussions took place from time to time, Brooke claims that they were not typical
for their time. Science challenged the dignity of the self, but human beings were
still seen as unique because of those attributes that distinguish them from other
living beings. One of these attributes is the faculty of reason. In Christianity this
faculty served to differentiate humans from other creatures and it made natural
theology possible. Darwin accused natural theologians of arrogance and evalu-
ated this theological enterprise as incurably anthropocentric. But again, Brooke
demonstrates that straight lines in history are rarely found. Is it really Darwin’s
argument that makes all the difference? Before him, the criticism by Hume and
Kant of natural theology was more foundational. And after Darwin revealed the
processes of natural selection, natural theology did not at all disappear. Through
his accurate historical analysis, Brooke demonstrates that the supposed irresolv-
able conflict between the so-called incommensurable worldviews of science and
religion can be regarded as a simplistic construction.
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2.3 Theological Explorations
In ‘How Music Models Divine Creation and Creativity’ Arthur Peacocke
suggests that certain kinds of relationships might begin to explain the origin of
the universe with time. It is Peacocke’s conviction that such a relationship exists
between creation by God as creatio ex nihilo and Haydn’s ‘The Representation of
Chaos’. This piece – one of the first examples of the Classical style of the 1790s
– creates the impression of formlessness and leaves us with a sense of mystery.
Although a critical analysis shows that it is not entirely formless, Hayden’s work
can give rise to an experience of timelessness, and this experience gives insight
into the circumstances of the very existence of our universe. Musical examples
concerning rhythm can give precision and meaning to another aspect of creation:
the way the potential can become actual. Peacocke offers other examples in which
the comparison between music and creation emerges: the way in which musical
forms are created out of notes (the building blocks of melody, harmony and
timbre), meter and rhythm is, to a certain extent, comparable to the creation of life
out of atoms, molecules, living cells, etc. By making these comparisons, Peacocke
tries to render the assertion of God as Creator intelligible.
Delwin Brown discusses four different ways of locating God: God as source,
God as agent, God as incarnate, and God as goal. Each of these understandings of
God in Christianity is related to a specific form of religious practice or ‘spirituality’.
When God is seen as the source, God is located as the ground of all that is. A sense
of wonder and gratitude accompanies this perspective as well as the heritage of the
apophatic tradition. If the emphasis is on God as agent, divine power and action
come to the fore. The intellectual challenge is to discover the divine purposes
and the practical one is to translate them into human action. This perspective is
commonly associated with systematic theologies. To say that God is the Incarnate
means that God is present in the world, not only in Christ but always: God is fully
at one with humanity and with creation. Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Harvey Cox can
be seen as theologians who represent this view. From the point of view of God
as goal, God is located in the future. Central to this perspective is the message
of the Kingdom of God. The practical consequence – life lived in active hope –
is expressed in political theologies and in theologies of liberation. At the end of
his contribution, Brown suggests that there may be a tension between the four
irreducible perspectives and our desire for rationality.
By way of a thought experiment, Niels Henrik Gregersen confronts Wentzel
van Huyssteen with Pascal Boyer by asking how a postfoundational theologian
could deal with the challenges and possibilities of evolutionary psychology. From
the hypothetical character of this question it follows that Gregersen wrote his
contribution after the publication of Alone in the World? where Van Huyssteen
critically discusses Boyer’s work. In Boyer’s theory of religion, religious concepts
are constructed by blending information coming from templates (‘aggregates of
memory’) such as ‘natural object’ and ‘person’. The result of this blending is
counterintuitive in relation to the activated template. Thus (human) persons are
born, but God is not. So the template ‘person’ is qualified when applied to God.
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Gregersen – acting as a postfoundational theologian sharing Van Huyssteen’s
view – claims that Boyer’s evolutionary psychological theory can only explain the
likelihood of religious belief and not the particular shape of a specific religious
tradition. Furthermore, Boyer, as an evolutionary psychologist, is not able to
evaluate the validity of religious beliefs nor assertions about religious realism.
With respect to the rationality of religious beliefs, Gregersen writes that Boyer’s
primary focus on religious concepts and mental representations falls short of other
important aspects of religious commitments: the question of the meaning of these
concepts, the way they are socially embedded in the lifeworlds of the believers,
and the pragmatic dimensions of religious communal life.
Richard Robert Osmer explores the potential contribution of Van Huyssteen’s
transversal model of interdisciplinarity to practical theology. Osmer character-
izes contemporary practical theology as a discipline that ‘investigates [Christian]
praxis empirically, interprets it to better understand and explain its patterns,
constructs a theological framework with which it can be assessed critically, and
provides practical models and guidelines for its future conduct and reform’. It
is easy to understand that a dialogue with other disciplines (such as therapeutic
psychology, educational studies, critical social theory and rhetoric) takes place at
every stage of research. After reflecting on the nature of the social sciences, Osmer
suggests that three different interdisciplinary approaches are currently at play
regarding practical theology’s relationship to the social sciences: the correlational
approach, the transformational model, and the transversal approach. The last one
is more person- and perspective-specific compared to the first and does not, as the
second tends to do, separate practical theology and social science from each other
in advance. Osmer believes further reflection is needed regarding the transversal
approach. He suggests that theological clarification can be achieved by including
a more robust dialogue with Christian eschatology, redemption, and the ecclesial
mission.
In ‘The Psalms and the Lyric Verse’ F.W. Dobbs-Allsopp analyzes the lan-
guage of Hebrew poems. By reviewing several lyric practices and tendencies from
the perspective of biblical scholarship, he succeeds in sharpening and extending
the understanding of the internal workings of psalmic verse. According to schol-
ars such as Frye and Alter, the Psalms are a kind of non-narrative, non-dramatic,
end non-representational kind of poetry. Unlike these scholars, Dobbs-Allsopp
does not try to show how Hebrew poetry moves toward narrative but how it
swerves away from narrative. As characteristics of lyric discourse, he mentions
its hymnic nature, associative working, evocative power of words, meter, rhyth-
mic devices, inclusions, chiasms, refrains, lineation, parallelism, word repetition,
vocality, utterability, musicality, paratax, and sequence. By describing lyric think-
ing in this way, he concludes that it is one of our reasoning strategies, ‘a thinking
otherwise’.
David Fergusson critically explores different types of natural theology. First,
he shows that all natural theology is context-dependent. This means, for instance,
that the design argument is conceptualized differently before and after 1859, that
the function of this argument depends on the way the relation between theol-
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ogy and science is postulated (e.g. as complementary or as competing types of
explanation), and that it depends on the socio-historical context in which it is
used. Next, he discusses five functions of natural theology: a foundational one in
modern epistemological projects, a deistic one to demonstrate religious truth, one
presenting proofs of general revelation (Thomas Aquinas), the apologetic function
of defeating objections to the Christian faith, and the one that shows that essential
claims of revelation can coexist with scientific knowledge. Fergusson concludes
by assessing the standard criticism articulated by Karl Barth on the enterprise
of natural theology (‘knowledge of God can only be found in Christ’). While the
first three types are immediately excluded, the last two types can be understood
– even in a Barthian vein – as necessary for the church’s pastoral and educational
work.
In ‘Public Theology in Postfoundational Tradition’ George Newlands ex-
plores the relevance of Van Huyssteen’s work for public theology. A postfoun-
dational approach to public theology means that an intelligent balance must
be found between, on the one hand, an essentialism that freezes all identities
and, on the other, a value-free perspective in which there are no viable truth
conditions. Bearing in mind some postfoundational considerations, Newlands ex-
amines the relationship between Christology and human rights, using as his case
study the striking transformation and reconciliation that occurred in South Africa,
Van Huyssteen’s native country. According to Newlands, a postfoundational ap-
proach – with its emphasis on the contextual as the way into the universal and the
specific point of need as the clue to reconciliation – can offer a highly sophisticated
and deeply illuminating conceptual framework for desperate problems of human
rights and human salvation.
The book ends with ‘A Complete Bibliography of Works by J. Wentzel van
Huyssteen’.
2.4 Evaluation
Van Huyssteen should be quite happy with the publication of this volume.
It is a very rich book in many ways. The authors cover a wide range of subjects—
not only in the field of science and theology but also in philosophy, the life
sciences and theology. In all three sections the reader finds original and fascinating
contributions from important authors, most of whom are authorities in their
disciplines. The book is a carefully edited hardcover edition with a beautiful dust
jacket. The only complaint so far might be the absence of female contributors. This
shortcoming is compensated only minimally by the many references to Hester,
Wentzel’s amiable wife. This is not to say that she is not worth mentioning – on
the contrary – but the reader will, of course, ask herself if the disciplines mentioned
above are occupied by male scholars only.
Something must be said about the division of the essays into three sec-
tions. For some of them, it is immediately clear why they are labeled ‘philo-
sophical’, ‘scientific’ or ‘theological’ (e.g. the essays of Schrag, Tattersall and
Osmer, respectively). For others, it is not. The contribution by Southgate, for
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instance, could also be called theological, and Spezio’s essay could be considered
a (neuro)philosophical exploration. From a Christian point of view, the essays
written by Ward, Ruse and Gregersen can be regarded as apologetic contributions
loaded with arguments against cheap criticisms of the Christian faith. In spite of
this similarity, these essays are found in the three different sections. The editor
recognizes the problem of classifying the contributions in philosophical, scientific
and theological explorations. According to him, the sections do not form water-
tight compartments but are all located in the field of interdisciplinary dialogue.
So almost every contribution concerns issues that belong to the field of philoso-
phy, the field of science and the field of theology. In LeRon Shults’ view, ‘. . . the
tripartite organization is intended to respect the way in which the contributors
begin with and/or focus on one dimension of the interdisciplinary dialogue’ (x).
I doubt if this criterion can really justify the classification of every single essay. I
think that in cases of doubt it would have been better to consider the background
of each author. The essay by Southgate, an honorary university fellow in theology,
would then have been placed in the third section and the essay by Ruse, a profes-
sor of philosophy, in the first section. This strategy would not have prevented all
organizational problems, but some could have been avoided.
Another question concerns the unity of the volume. Is the ‘evolution of ratio-
nality’ really the central theme shared by all the essays? If this term is understood
as consisting of two different concepts, ‘evolution’ and ‘rationality’, and if ‘evo-
lution’ is then understood as ‘(evolutionary) biology’ and ‘rationality’ as, among
other things, ‘the features of a pattern’ and ‘the logic of discourse’, then every
contribution concerns the central theme. However, if the term ‘the evolution of
rationality’ is explained in a strict sense as the emergence and development of
our capacity to argue and to reason, then only one essay truly deals with this
theme, namely that by Ian Tattersall. Many of the other essays can be linked to
this theme in looser way. But, the connection is problematic regarding some of
them. The essays by Arthur Peacocke and David Fergusson are not about (evo-
lutionary) biology nor about rationality, Delwin Brown’s contribution poses a
question about the rationality of the four irreducible perspectives on God only at
the very end, and F.W. Dobbs-Allsopp describes the discourse of the Psalms as a
mode of thinking while also claiming that some poems do not even construct an
argument (353), thus – I would say – leading to the conclusion that lyric thinking
is not a way of rational thinking. This is not to say, of course, that these essays are
not worth reading nor that they do not concern the broad topic of ‘science and
theology’, but I like to observe that the concentration of these contributors on the
central theme would have improved the unity of this volume.
3 Taking Religion Seriously?
There are, of course, many ways in which the contributions to this volume
can be subdivided. From the perspective of the scholar who is honored by the
publication of this book, it would be interesting to order them in the way that
they relate to his work. One can thus answer the question if Van Huyssteen takes
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religion seriously. I suggest a division into five parts. The first part would consist
of contributions that are related to Van Huyssteen’s works only because they
concern themes that are also present in his oeuvre: those by Peacocke, Brown,
Dobbs-Allsopp and Ferguson.
The second part would include the essays by Reynhout, Schrag and Stone.
These essays can be characterized by the fact that they pay attention to key themes
in Van Huyssteen’s work without challenging his conclusions. In Reynhout’s case,
this is logical because his aim was to give an overview of the main developments
in Van Huyssteen’s thought. Schrag and Stone had the opportunity to raise ques-
tions regarding Van Huyssteen’s concept of rationality or his methodology for
comparing science and religion, but at most they broaden his results by refer-
ring to classical thinkers in philosophy (Schrag) and by comparing his work to
contemporary scholars in the field of science and theology (Stone).
The contributions to be included in the third part are characterized by a loose
connection to Van Huyssteen’s publications. The essays by Stenmark, Trigg, Ward,
Clottes, Lewis-Williams, Tattersall, Southgate, Rolston, and Brooke are all about
an aspect of Van Huyssteen’s work, and explore, from that starting point, their
own research interests. The point of departure for the essays by Stenmark, Trigg
and Ward is Van Huyssteen’s postfoundational concept of rationality. Stenmark
meticulously analyzes concepts that are related to the value-free view of science
and its alternatives, Trigg clearly reflects on the relation between reality and ra-
tionality, and Ward presents an original exposé of Enlightenment philosophers
on reason. The contributions by Clottes, Lewis-Williams and Tattersall share Van
Huyssteen’s interest in human evolution. They show what science can tell us about
the emergence of symbolic thought and religious imaginings and representations.
Like Van Huyssteen, Southgate and Rolston write on more general developments
in biology. Although their interests – in ecology and information biology, respec-
tively – diverge from Van Huyssteen’s, they all apply their scientific knowledge to
theology and personal faith. Finally, Brooks elaborates on Van Huyssteen’s work
on human uniqueness via a historical analysis of thinking about the self.
The essays that belong to the fourth part apply Van Huyssteen’s thought to
fields he did not explore himself (at the moment of the writing of these contribu-
tions). Spezio relates Van Huyssteen’s key concept of ‘interpreted experience’ to
the neurosciences,3 Gregersen connects the concept of postfoundational theology
to evolutionary psychology,4 and Osmer and Newlands explore the implications
of this concept for the fields of practical theology and public theology respectively.
The fifth and last part would consist of essays containing an explicit critical
view of Van Huyssteen’s work and with some indications for further research. Of
course, many of the essays can be characterized by the last mentioned feature. The
contributions by Gregersen and Trigg, for instance, contain fruitful suggestions:
the first on the possibility of (further) integrating embodied cognitive science
3. In Alone in the World? 88, 256–261 Van Huyssteen deals with this subject himself.
4. In Alone in the World? 261–267 Van Huyssteen himself criticizes the position of Pascal
Boyer (and refers to Gregersen’s criticisms!).
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into a postfoundational concept of rationality and the second on the need to en-
dorse certain assumptions regarding religious claims. However, these essays do
not really challenge Van Huyssteen’s conclusions. As far as I can see, only Ruse,
Clayton and Wildman do so. In a provocative style and with a good sense of
humor, Ruse encourages Van Huyssteen (and others) to rethink the relationship
between Darwinism and Christianity and, in particular, stimulates Christians to
reevaluate the writings of Dawkins and other atheists. The criticisms by Clay-
ton and Wildman are more severe than Ruse’s evaluation and are even of vital
importance for the relationship between science and religion. Clayton refers to
what he rightly calls a crucial passage in The Shaping of Rationality: it concerns
an ‘important epistemological overlap between theological and scientific modes
of inquiry: we relate to our world epistemically only through the mediation of
interpreted experience, and in this sense it may be said that theology and the sci-
ences offer alternative interpretations of our experience.’5 But, as I like to ad, since
The Shaping of Rationality does not contain specific examples of the mediation of
interpreted experience in science and theology, we do not know exactly what such
an overlap means and what the consequences are for human self-conception or
for theological truth claims. To say that the heavens are God’s work and to claim
that the large hole (the foramen magnum) in the skull fragments of Sahelanthropus
is evidence of bipedality are both examples of interpreted experience. So what?
Do the arguments for the second statement make the first more plausible? Or is
the validity of the second one diminished by the speculative character of the first?
It is simply not clear what conclusions can be drawn.6 That is why Clayton raises
questions about the possibility of giving a rational assessment of the efforts of
individual persons to interpret their experiences in a meaningful way. Can this
task really be accomplished and is it appropriate that Van Huyssteen pays no
attention to its possible failure?
With his comment on the absence of the idea of correctability, Wildman
goes to the heart of the matter. Although he situates his criticism in the context
of Van Huyssteen’s unwillingness to entertain metaphysical hypotheses, he also
reflects upon the variations in strength of the feedback mechanisms throughout
the different academic disciplines. According to Wildman this makes reality seem
fuzzy. ‘This is nowhere more true than in religion but there are elements of it
even in fundamental physics, or wherever the feedback mechanism is weak or
non-consistent’ (45). Speaking about ‘possible failure’ in Clayton’s sense can thus
be related to the feedback mechanisms about which Wildman is writing. One
5. J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, The Shaping of Rationality: Toward Interdisciplinarity in Theology
and Science (Grand Rapids / London 1999), 184.
6. Edwin Koster, In betovering gevangen? Over verhaal en rationaliteit, religie en irrationaliteit
(Budel 2005), 411-18, in particular 417f. There are indications in Van Huyssteen’s work in which he
explicitly suggests refraining from abstract or ‘high theology’. Instead, he recommends rereading
the biblical texts: Alone in the World? 149; cf. the 6th proposition of his thesis (translation EK): ‘The
question whether the Christian message is true or false can be answered only by referring to the
content of that message.’ Unfortunately he did not follow his own suggestion in The Shaping of
Rationality.
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Figure 1: The Knowledge Filter. From: Henry H. Bauer, ‘Ethics in Science’,
http://www.files.chem.vt.edu/chem-ed/ethics/hbauer/hbauer-toc.html.
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way to present these feedback mechanisms in science is by way of the so- called
‘knowledge filter’.7 The filter consists of different levels. The first contains all
kinds of suggestions concerning the achievement of knowledge: conventional
wisdom, facts mentioned in newspapers, beliefs, folklore and expert opinions. If
all nonsense, stupidities and pseudo-scientific claims are removed from this set of
statements – are ‘filtered out’ – we enter the second level, called ‘frontier science’.
Here we find science in the context of discovery: the daily practice of scientific
research.
After discussing ideas with fellow researchers, presenting preliminary re-
sults at conferences, and consulting senior scientists about the conclusions, one
can try to publish the results in a scientific article that is submitted to a journal. If
it is accepted and has thus passed the threshold called peer review, we enter the
level of ‘primary literature’. Matters of bias, error and dishonesty should then be
filtered out. We then go to the next levels, called ‘secondary literature’ and ‘text-
book science’, as long as the results (i) of the original enquiry can be replicated,
(ii) are in accordance with the results in other fields of the same discipline and,
(iii) match the results in other disciplines. Thus, through all kinds of feedback
mechanisms, deficiencies are eliminated and only reliable results survive. The
question, of course, is if this filter really operates in the practice of scientific re-
search. It can be shown, for instance, that the filter functions as expected regarding
theories about human evolution—for example the competition between the ‘Out
of Africa model’ and the ‘multiregional hypothesis’.8 However, in case of testing
medicines, it is otherwise. Feedback mechanisms, such as replications by indepen-
dent scientists, are rare in the pharmaceutical industry. Various regulations are
necessary to compensate for the disadvantages of commodified research.9 Thus,
the knowledge filter does not automatically produce reliable results in the life
sciences. It can be expected that the effect of subjective distortions increases with
the humanities in comparison to the natural sciences. However, for example, it
can be demonstrated in history that incorrectly formed results, distorted by, for
instance, false subjective preferences, can be eliminated most of the time.10
Therefore, it may be assumed that, to a certain degree, the knowledge fil-
ter functions properly in scientific practice. Does this conclusion also hold for
religious studies? What about claims in theology and the study of religion? Do
similar feedback mechanisms, which prevent the production of unreliable claims,
exist in these academic fields? Does the knowledge filter work here as well? The
suggestions by Clayton (‘the rational assessment of theological claims is not so
7. Henry H. Bauer, Scientific Literacy and the Myth of the Scientific Method (Urbana 1992),
42–51.
8. Edwin Koster (ed.), Wetenschapsfilosofie. Een inleiding voor levenswetenschappers en medici
(Amsterdam 2009).
9. Cf. the contributions in Hans Radder (ed.), The Commodification of Academic Research:
Analyses, Assessments, Alternatives, (Pittsburgh 2009).
10. Edwin Koster, ‘Historical Understanding and Judgment: On Intentional Explanation,
Colligatory Concepts and Narrative Exposure’, in: H.W. de Regt, S. Leonelli and K. Eigner (eds.)
Scientific Understanding. Philosophical Perspectives (Pittsburgh 2009).
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easy to accomplish’) and Wildman (‘the strength of the feedback mechanisms in
religion is weak or non-existent’) does leave ample room for positive conjectures.
In my view, the transcendent dimension of religious practice makes it hard to see
how religious experiences, behavior, conceptions and representations can indeed
be tested. Of course, something can be said about the way they fit into the totality
of a religious tradition, and religious narratives can, for instance, be considered as
‘empirically fitting’ existential experiences. Thus, after a disaster like a tsunami,
praying to God to be with the victims may be in accordance with certain kinds
of convictions (‘God is not present in destroying events’, ‘God suffers when his
people suffer’, ‘God is a source of comfort’) and practices (to pray in difficult situ-
ations, to put one’s trust in God in all circumstances) in one’s religious tradition.
Arguments can also be given for the fact that this experience matches biblical
stories such as the one about Job. So, (i) reasons can underpin the claim that
certain religious conceptions, representations and practices belong to a specific
religious tradition, and (ii) a rational assessment can be given for the claim that
these conceptions, representations and practices pass the test of empirical fit. But
since religious traditions are heteronymous configurations with a wide scope, con-
victions that contradict each other can belong to the same tradition. So, another
Christian believer could thank God for punishing his people for their sins through
the tsunami. It is possible to show that this conviction is also in accordance with
elements of the religious tradition involved (‘God hates sinful behavior’, ‘Sinners
don’t get away scot-free’, ‘God acts according to his will’) and that the underlying
experience matches many biblical stories such as the tragic ones about King Saul.
Thus, in some way it can be said that ‘feedback mechanisms’ exist to test these
claims. But how are we to judge the claim that ‘God is with the victims’ or the
claim that ‘God punishes his people’? Believers sometimes want to know if their
convictions are more than mere illusions. It does not seem possible to construct a
feedback mechanism to ‘test’ this kind of religious utterance. The data do not ex-
ercise any control at all on the religious interpretation with respect to such claims.
In other words, they cannot be rationally justified. The transcendent dimension
prevents such efforts, either because it is the pure product of human imagination
or because it is really transcendent and thus beyond human reason.11
It is not my intention to suggest that Van Huyssteen thinks such claims can
simply be rationally assessed. On the contrary. If one of the many authors to whom
he refers in his books includes God as an explanatory factor, he is the first to protest.
Van Huyssteen considers such a claim to be ‘theologically problematical because it
does not take into account the power of imagination, and the spectacular ability of
the human mind to delude itself’.12 According to him, religion is characterized by
‘a high degree of personal involvement and commitment’, ‘a radical contextuality
of its experiences’, ‘the symbolic structure of its convictions and practices’, and by
‘. . . an element of mystery . . . [as] the most crucial and telling difference between
theology and the sciences. This kind of mystery is unique to the experiential
11. Koster, In betovering gevangen?, 399–427.
12. Van Huyssteen, Alone in the World? 106.
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resources and epistemic focus of theology, and very definitely sets it apart from
the very focused empirical scope of the natural sciences.’13 However, in other
sections of his writings Van Huyssteen emphasizes that the difference between
science on the one hand and theology and religion on the other are quite small.
For example: ‘Despite many important differences between these two reasoning
strategies, I see this epistemic goal of experiential accountability playing out as
only a gradual difference between empirical adequacy for science, and experiential
adequacy for theological understanding, respectively.’14
It is hard to see how these different kinds of statements can be coherently
connected. If I see it correctly, I agree with Clayton and Wildman on this issue: Van
Huyssteen sometimes gives the impression of underestimating the specific char-
acter of religion. In this sense, I think he does not take religion seriously enough.
Although theologians must be pressed most of the time to take science seriously,
it must not be forgotten that it is necessary to take religion seriously as well. In
my view, this is a valid and important point of criticism in the field of ‘Science
and Religion’ and ‘Science and Theology’. If, for instance, religious convictions or
practices are confronted with scientific statements, it is sometimes unconsciously
assumed that they can both be seen as forms of ‘knowledge’. But it is far from
self-evident that we can speak of ‘knowledge’ in the case of religion. Reflection on
the nature of knowledge and on the nature of religion is necessary before one is
able to confront elements of these different approaches to reality. Another example
is the vehement discussion on evolution, creationism and intelligent design. The
discussants usually interpret the first chapters of Genesis as a report about God
acting as a causal factor and thus do not take account of the ‘latest results’ in exe-
gesis and biblical theology nor of the specific nature of these biblical narratives.15
A last example is related to what I have been calling ‘the different approaches
to reality in science and religion’. It is sometimes assumed that science concerns
facts, and religion concerns not facts but such things as moral behavior or the
meaning of life. But how do we know this? In the fields of ‘Science and Religion’
and ‘Science and Theology’ scholars rarely refer to empirical studies of religious
practices. What these scholars have to say about the nature of religion seems to
be their own normative stance (‘(I believe that) religion is not about facts’) and
not the results of scientific research regarding really existing practices. In the end,
not only is the scientific study of religion not taken seriously then, but religion
itself is not taken seriously either. Van Huyssteen should also take religion more
seriously in the sense that he has to clarify how his remarks on the specific nature
of religion can be related to his claims about the small differences between these
phenomena. Only if he specifies his position more clearly can a deliberate answer
be given to the question how science and theology are related. Up until now he
seems to choose mainly for a ‘duet’ relationship. The question is whether this
relationship has to be described as a ‘duet’ or a ‘duel’ if religion is taken seriously.
13. Idem, The Shaping of Rationality, 115, 162, 219–221, 259f. (quotation on page 220).
14. Ibidem, 181, 183 (quotation), 188v, 231. Cf. Van Huyssteen, Alone in the World? 159, 264.
15. Koster, In betovering gevangen?, 223–331.
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How is one to assess this relationship if religion is seen as an irreducible symbolic
practice or as a hermeneutical whole in which existential questions about, for in-
stance, contingency and mortality are raised? By focusing on its specific character,
religion may reveal its own form of rationality—in spite of its common resources
with other practices.
I am aware that my remarks are very marginal compared to the rich volumes
and articles by Van Huyssteen on this subject. They are not meant, of course, to
harm the reputation of the scholar who is honored by this volume. I hope instead
that this discussion note also contributes to honoring Van Huyssteen’s work by
exploring new ways of thinking about the relationship between rationality and
religion.
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